Tariffs and Technology Transfer through an Intermediate Product
AbstractWe examine the relationship between tariffs and North-South technology transfer in an oligopoly model when technology is embodied in a key component that only North firms can produce. They may have an incentive to transfer their technologies to South firms even if the South's licensing market is restricted or if intellectual property right protection is imperfect in the South. Interestingly, a decrease in the tariff on the final good as well as an increase may induce technology transfer. Our analysis suggests that the South should implement pro-competitive policies to induce technology transfer and enhance welfare. Copyright 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of International Economics.
Volume (Year): 17 (2009)
Issue (Month): SI (05)
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Other versions of this item:
- Eiji Horiuchi & Jota Ishikawa, 2007. "Tariffs and Technology Transfer through an Intermediate Product," Discussion Papers 2007-15, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
- F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
- F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
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