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Conjectural Variations, Market Power, and Optimal Trade Policy in a Vertically Related Industry

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  • Winston W. Chang
  • Hajime Sugeta

Abstract

The paper introduces the conjectural variations and bargaining approaches into a vertical model wherein a foreign upstream firm supplies one input to two downstream firms that produce differentiated products for the export market. Various downstream firms’ competition modes and upstream's pricing schemes emerge as special cases of this formulation. The authors show that the optimal export policy of a downstream country depends crucially on the downstream firms’ conjectures of rivals’ responses, the upstream firm's pricing schemes, their relative bargaining powers, and the degree of product differentiation. If the upstream's pricing or bargaining power is strong (weak) and if the downstream's degree of competition is high (low), a tax (subsidy) is optimal owing to a strong (weak) vertical profit‐shifting effect and a weak (strong) horizontal effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Winston W. Chang & Hajime Sugeta, 2004. "Conjectural Variations, Market Power, and Optimal Trade Policy in a Vertically Related Industry," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 12-26, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:12:y:2004:i:1:p:12-26
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2004.00428.x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chang, Winston W. & Chen, Fang-yueh, 2016. "Strategic managerial delegation and industrial policy competition in vertically-related markets," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 429-442.
    2. Julio B. Clempner & Alexander S. Poznyak, 2019. "Solving Transfer Pricing Involving Collaborative and Non-cooperative Equilibria in Nash and Stackelberg Games: Centralized–Decentralized Decision Making," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 54(2), pages 477-505, August.
    3. Tai‐Liang Chen & Ying Kuang, 2023. "Endogenous timing, strategic tariff game and bilateral trade in vertical oligopoly," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 74-96, February.
    4. Choi, Kangsik & Lim, Seonyoung, 2014. "Strategic Trade Policies with Endogenous Choice of Competition Mode under a Vertical Structure," MPRA Paper 59074, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Yungho Weng & Chih-Ming Hung, 2020. "Tariff escalation and de-escalation: the role of market structure," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(2), pages 233-246, April.
    6. Gjermund Nese & Odd Straume, 2007. "Industry Concentration and Strategic Trade Policy in Successive Oligopoly," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 31-52, March.
    7. Yasushi Kawabata, 2010. "Strategic Export Policy In Vertically Related Markets," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 109-131, April.
    8. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:6:y:2008:i:8:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Chang, Winston W. & Ryu, Han Eol, 2016. "Export rivalry, vertically-related markets, and optimal public ownership policy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 392-401.
    10. Chen, Fang-Yueh, 2023. "Trade warfare and sanctions in vertically related markets," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    11. Ghosh, Arghya & Saha, Souresh, 2015. "Price competition, technology licensing and strategic trade policy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 91-99.
    12. Tomomichi Mizuno & Kazuhiro Takauchi, 2020. "Optimal Export Policy With Upstream Price Competition," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 88(2), pages 324-348, March.
    13. Kawabata, Yasushi & Yanase, Akihiko & Kurata, Hiroshi, 2010. "Vertical trade and free trade agreements," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 569-585, December.
    14. Mantian Xue, 2022. "“Spare Wheel” R&D in vertically related markets," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(4), pages 1105-1112, June.
    15. Akihiko Yanase & Yasushi Kawabata, 2008. "Strategic Import Policies in a Three Country Model with Vertically Related Industries," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 6(8), pages 1-7.
    16. Yasushi Kawabata, 2020. "Strategic export policy towards raw materials in vertically related markets," International Journal of Economic Policy Studies, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 239-253, February.
    17. Wang, Leonard F.S. & Lee, Jen-yao, 2014. "Ranking the optimum tariff and the maximum revenue tariff in vertically related markets," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 222-229.
    18. Lee, Chien-Hui & Lee, Jen-Yao & Wang, Leonard F.S., 2021. "Foreign Ownership and Optimal Discriminatory Tariffs under Oligopolistic Competition," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 74(1), pages 97-114.

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