Tax Competition, Capital Mobility, and Public Good Provision within a Trading Block
AbstractThe authors examine a two-country general-equilibrium model of a two-country trading block where governments through tax policies attract mobile capital and provide an imported public consumption good. Within this framework the authors examine, among other things, how preferences over the public good and the size (population) of a country affect the Nash or cooperative equilibrium values of income tax rates in the two countries. The analysis identifies sufficient conditions under which (i) the Nash/cooperative equilibrium income tax rates are strategic substitutes or complements, and (ii) the Nash equilibrium income tax rates may be greater than the cooperative rates. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of International Economics.
Volume (Year): 10 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0965-7576
Other versions of this item:
- Costas Hadjiyiannis & Panos Hatzipanayotou & Michael S. Michael, 2001. "Tax Competition, Capital Mobility and Public Good Provision Within a Trading Block," CESifo Working Paper Series 524, CESifo Group Munich.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wildasin, D.E., 1987.
"Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1987020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Amrita Dhillon & Carlo Perroni & Kim Scharf, 1997.
"Implementing tax co-ordination,"
IFS Working Papers
W97/12, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Amrita Dhillon & Carlo Perroni & Kimberley A. Scharf, . "Implementing Tax Coordination," EPRU Working Paper Series 97-09, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Dhillon, A. & Perroni, C. & Scharf, K.A., 1997. "Implementing Tax Coordination," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 501, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Haufler, Andreas & Wooton, Ian, 1999.
"Country size and tax competition for foreign direct investment,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 121-139, January.
- Andreas Haufler & Ian Wooton, . "Country Size and Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investment," Working Papers 9702, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
- Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May.
- Gordon, Roger H & Wilson, John Douglas, 1986. "An Examination of Multijurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation under Formula Apportionment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1357-73, November.
- Hoyt, William H., 1991. "Property taxation, Nash equilibrium, and market power," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 123-131, July.
- Ravi Kanbur & Michael Keen, 1991.
"Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size,"
819, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-92, September.
- MINTZ, Jacques & TULKENS , Henry, 1994.
"Optimality Properties of Alternative Systems of Taxation of Foreign Capital Income,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1994078, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Mintz, Jack & Tulkens, Henry, 1996. "Optimality properties of alternative systems of taxation of foreign capital income," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 373-399, June.
- King, Mervyn A., 1986. "A pigovian rule for the optimum provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 273-291, August.
- Bucovetsky, Sam & Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with two tax instruments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 333-350, November.
- Huber, Bernd, 1999. "Tax competition and tax coordination in an optimum income tax model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 441-458, March.
- Costas Hadjiyiannis & Panos Hatzipanayotou & Michael S. Michael, 2004. "Pollution and Capital Tax Competition within a Regional Block," CESifo Working Paper Series 1208, CESifo Group Munich.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.