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A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings

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Author Info
BERNHEIM
SLAVOV

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Abstract

We define and explore the notion of a Dynamic Condorcet Winner (DCW), which extends the notion of a Condorcet winner to dynamic settings. We show that, for every DCW, every member of a large class of dynamic majoritarian games has an equivalent equilibrium, and that other equilibria are not similarly portable across this class of games. Existence of DCWs is guaranteed when members of the community are sufficiently patient. We characterize sustainable and unsustainable outcomes, study the effects of changes in the discount factor, investigate efficiency properties, and explore the potential for achieving renegotiation-proof outcomes. We apply this solution concept to a standard one-dimensional choice problem wherein agents have single-peaked preferences, as well as to one involving the division of a fixed aggregate pay-off. Copyright © 2009 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00520.x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 76 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (01)
Pages: 33-62
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:76:y:2009:i:1:p:33-62

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0034-6527

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  1. Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000051, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Roger Lagunoff, 2005. "Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions," Game Theory and Information 0501003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Jinhui Bai & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "On the “Faustian” Dynamics of Policy and Political Power," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001627, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 47, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Kevin Roberts, 2007. "Condorcet cycles? A model of intertemporal voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 383-404, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Sita Nataraj Slavov, 2001. "Age Bias in Fiscal Policy: Why Does the Political Process Favor the Elderly?," Occidental Economics Working Papers 1, Occidental College, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.

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