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Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs

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Author Info
NICOLA PAVONI
VIOLANTE

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Abstract

A Welfare-to-Work (WTW) program is a mix of government expenditures on various labour market policies targeted to the unemployed ("e.g. "unemployment insurance (UI), job search monitoring (JM), social assistance (SA), wage subsidies). This paper provides a dynamic principal-agent framework suitable for analysing chief features of an optimal WTW program, such as the sequence and duration of the different policies, the dynamic pattern of payments along the unemployment spell, and the emergence of taxes/subsidies upon re-employment. The optimal program endogenously generates an absorbing policy of last resort ("social assistance") characterized by a constant lifetime payment and no active participation by the agent. Human capital depreciation is a necessary condition for policy transitions to be part of an optimal WTW program. The typical sequence of policies is quite simple: the program starts with standard UI, then switches into monitored search and, finally, into SA. The optimal benefits are decreasing during unemployment insurance and constant during both JM and SA. Whereas taxes (subsidies) can be either increasing or decreasing with duration during UI, they must decrease (increase) during a phase of JM. In a calibration exercise, we use our model to analyse quantitatively the features of the optimal program for the U.S. economy. With respect to the existing U.S. system, the optimal WTW scheme delivers sizeable welfare gains to unskilled workers because the incentives to search for a job can be retained even while delivering more insurance and using costly monitoring less intensively. Copyright 2007 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 74 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (01)
Pages: 283-318
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:74:y:2007:i:1:p:283-318

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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Stefanie Behncke & Markus Fröhlich & Michael Lechner, 2007. "Unemployed and their Caseworkers: Should they be Friends or Foes?," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2007 2007-45, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Torben M. Andersen & Michael Svarer, 2008. "The role of workfare in striking a balance between incentives and insurance in the labour market," Economics Working Papers 2008-05, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Borys Grochulski, 2008. "Limits to redistribution and intertemporal wedges : implications of Pareto optimality with private information," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 173-196. [Downloadable!]
  4. Trine Filges & John Kennes & Birthe Larsen & Torben Tranæs, 2007. "Labour Market Policy and the Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off," IZA Discussion Papers 2824, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  5. Hairault, Jean-Olivier & Langot, François & Ménard, Sébastien & Sopraseuth, Thepthida, 2009. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers," IZA Discussion Papers 4071, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  6. Filges, Trine & Kennes, John & Larsen, Birthe & Tranæs, Torben, 2006. "Labour Market Programmes and the Equity-Efficiency Trade-off," Working Papers 11-2005, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Evelyn Ribi, 2009. "Optimal Size and Intensity of Job Search Assistance Programs," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2009 2009-19, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
  8. Pavoni, Nicola & Violante, Giovanni L, 2006. "Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs," CEPR Discussion Papers 5937, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Boeri, Tito & Macis, Mario, 2008. "Do Unemployment Benefits Promote or Hinder Structural Change?," IZA Discussion Papers 3371, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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