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Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents

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Author Info
KFIR ELIAZ
RAN SPIEGLER

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Abstract

In standard contract-theoretic models, the underlying assumption is that agent types differ in their preference or cost parameters, and the principal's objective is to design contracts in order to screen this type. We study a contract-theoretic model in which the heterogeneity among agent types is of a "cognitive" nature. In our model, the agent has dynamically inconsistent preferences. Agent types differ only in their degree of "sophistication", that is, their ability to forecast the change in their future tastes. We fully characterize the menu of contracts which the principal offers in order to screen the agent's sophistication. The menu does not exclude any type: it provides a perfect commitment device for relatively sophisticated types, and "exploitative" contracts which involve speculation with relatively naive types. More naive types are more heavily exploited and generate a greater profit for the principal. Our results allow us to interpret real-life contractual arrangements in a variety of industries. Copyright 2006 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00392.x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 73 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (07)
Pages: 689-714
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:73:y:2006:i:3:p:689-714

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ran Spiegler, 2005. "Competition over Agents with Boundedly Rational Expectations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000535, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Self-Confidence And Personal Motivation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 871-915, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Manuel Amador & George-Marios Angeletos & Ivan Werning, 2004. "Commitment vs. Flexibility," 2004 Meeting Papers 87, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Stefano Della Vigna & Ulrike Malmendier, 2004. "Contract Design and Self-control: Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(2), pages 353-402, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 1999. "Incentives For Procrastinators," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 769-816, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Esteban, Susanna & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Shum, Matthew, 2007. "Nonlinear pricing with self-control preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 306-338, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Spiegler, Ran, 2006. "Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(2), pages 207-231, June. [Downloadable!]
  8. Leeat Yariv, 2004. "Safety in Markets: An Impossibility Theorem for Dutch Books," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000072, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Muhamet Yildiz, 2003. "Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 793-811, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein, 2003. "Modeling the Economic Interaction of Agents With Diverse Abilities to Recognize Equilibrium Patterns," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(1), pages 212-223, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Hanming Fang & Giuseppe Moscarini, 2003. "Morale Hazard," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1422, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Leeat Yariv & David Laibson, 2004. "Safety in Markets: An Impossibility Theorem for Dutch Books," 2004 Meeting Papers 867, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Malmendier, Ulrike M. & Della Vigna, Stefano, 2003. "Overestimating Self-Control: Evidence from the Health Club Industry," Research Papers 1800, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
  14. Ted O' Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 2001. "Choice and Procrastination," Microeconomics 0012002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  15. Ran Spiegler, 2006. "The Market for Quacks," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 73(4), pages 1113-1131, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 1999. "Doing It Now or Later," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 103-124, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Gilpatric, Scott M., 2008. "Present-biased preferences, self-awareness and shirking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 735-754, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 2001. "Choice And Procrastination," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 121-160, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 2003. "Projection Bias In Predicting Future Utility," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(4), pages 1209-1248, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2001. "Temptation and Self-Control," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1403-1435, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Inderst, Roman & Peitz, Martin, 2008. "Selling Service Plans to Differentially Informed Customers," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-125, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran, 2005. "Speculative Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 5433, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Gine, Xavier & Karlan, Dean & Zinman, Jonathan, 2009. "Put your money where your butt is : a commitment contract for smoking cessation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4985, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  4. Ran Spiegler, 2005. "Competition over Agents with Boundedly Rational Expectations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000535, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran, 2005. "A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 5434, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, 2006. "Paying Not to Go to the Gym," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 694-719, June. [Downloadable!]
  7. Kalyan Chatterjee & R. Vijay Krishna, 2005. "Menu Choice, Environmental Cues and Temptation: A “Dual Self” Approach to Self-control," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000576, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  8. Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 2006. "Incentives and Self Control," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001262, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Edward Cartwright & Amrish Patel, 2008. "Public Goods, Social Norms and Naive Beliefs," Studies in Economics 0807, Department of Economics, University of Kent. [Downloadable!]
  10. Nava Ashraf & James Berry & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2007. "Can Higher Prices Stimulate Product Use? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Zambia," NBER Working Papers 13247, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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