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Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets

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Author Info
PATRICK BOLTON
JOSÉ SCHEINKMAN
WEI XIONG

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Abstract

We present a multiperiod agency model of stock-based executive compensation in a speculative stock market, where investors have heterogeneous beliefs and stock prices may deviate from underlying fundamentals and include a speculative option component. This component arises from the option to sell the stock in the future to potentially overoptimistic investors. We show that optimal compensation contracts may emphasize short-term stock performance, at the expense of long-run fundamental value, as an incentive to induce managers to pursue actions which increase the speculative component in the stock price. Our model provides a different perspective on the recent corporate crisis than the "rent extraction view" of executive compensation. Copyright 2006 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00388.x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 73 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (07)
Pages: 577-610
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:73:y:2006:i:3:p:577-610

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  1. Friebel, Guido & Guriev, Sergei, 2005. "Earnings Manipulation and Incentives in Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 4850, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Wim Fonteyne, 2007. "Cooperative Banks in Europe--Policy Issues," IMF Working Papers 07/159, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  3. Han, Bing & Hirshleifer, David & Persons, John, 2007. "Promotion Tournaments and Capital Rationing," MPRA Paper 6496, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Arantxa Jarque, 2008. "Optimal CEO compensation and stock options," Working Papers. Serie EC 2008-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  5. Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2005. "Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value," NBER Working Papers 11241, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. James Angel & Douglas McCabe, 2008. "The Ethics of Managerial Compensation: The Case of Executive Stock Options," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 78(1), pages 225-235, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Riccardo Calcagno & Florian Heider, 2007. "Market based compensation, price informativeness and short-term trading," Working Paper Series 735, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  8. Bernd Theilen, 2008. "Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  9. J. Scheinkman & W. Xiong, 2002. "Overconfidence, Short-Sale Constraints and Bubbles," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers 98734966f1c1a57373801367f, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  10. Daniel Bergstresser & Mihir A. Desai & Joshua Rauh, 2004. "Earnings Manipulation and Managerial Investment Decisions: Evidence from Sponsored Pension Plans," NBER Working Papers 10543, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, 2006. "Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?," NBER Working Papers 12365, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Efraim Benmelech & Eugene Kandel & Pietro Veronesi, 2008. "Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives," NBER Working Papers 13732, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Riccardo Calcagno & Florian Heider, 2004. "Market Based Compensation, Trading And Liquidity," Business Economics Working Papers wb046224, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía de la Empresa. [Downloadable!]
  14. G. Sarens, 2007. "The Agency Model as a Predictor of the Size of the Internal Audit Function in Belgian Companies," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 07/458, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
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