This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Special Interests and Technological Change

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Giorgio Bellettini
Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We study an OLG economy where productivity growth comes from two alternative sources: process innovation and learning-by-doing. There is a trade-off between the two in so far as frequent technological updates reduce the scope for learning on existing technologies. A conflict is shown to arise between the young and the old, because the former favour innovation while the latter prefer learning. We model the interaction between overlapping generations and policy makers as a dynamic common agency problem, where competing generations invest a certain amount of resources to lobby either for the maintenance of the current technology or the adoption of a new one. By focusing on truthful Markov perfect equilibria, we characterize the political equilibrium and show its dependence on the underlying demographic, technological and preference parameters. Copyright The Review of Economic Studies Limited, 2005.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0034-6527.00323
File Format: text/html
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 72 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (01)
Pages: 43-56
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:72:y:2005:i:1:p:43-56

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0034-6527

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0034-6527

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1996. "Intergenerational Redistribution with Short-Lived Governments," NBER Working Papers 5447, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Prescott, Edward C, 1998. "Needed: A Theory of Total Factor Productivity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(3), pages 525-51, August.
    Other versions:
  3. Krusell, Per & Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, 1996. "Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 301-29, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Dirk & Juuso Valimaki, 1998. "Dynamic Common Agency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1206, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1996. " Auctions: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(4), pages 367-420, December.
    Other versions:
  8. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 2001. "Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Actions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 191-219, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Lohmann, Susanne, 1995. " Information, Access, and Contributions: A Signaling Model of Lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 85(3-4), pages 267-84, December.
  10. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-69, August.
  11. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Igor D. Livshits & James C. MacGee, 2008. "Barriers to Technology Adoption and Entry," University of Western Ontario, RBC Financial Group Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers 20087, University of Western Ontario, RBC Financial Group Economic Policy Research Institute. [Downloadable!]
  2. Desmet, Klaus & Parente, Stephen, 2006. "Bigger is Better: Market Size, Demand Elasticity and Resistance to Technology Adoption," CEPR Discussion Papers 5825, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Giovanni Prarolo & Francesco Lancia, 2007. "A Politico-Economic Model of Aging, Technology Adoption and Growth," Working Papers 2007.48, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Giorgio Bellettini & Carlotta Berti Ceroni, 2005. "When the Union Hurts the Workers: A Positive Analysis of Immigration Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  5. E. Bilancini & Simone D’Alessandro, 2006. "Functional Distribution, Land Ownership and Industrial Takeoff: The Role of Effective Demand," DEGIT Conference Papers c011_051, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade. [Downloadable!]
  6. Benjamin R. Bridgman & Igor D. Livshits & James C. MacGee, 2004. "For Sale: Barriers to Riches," University of Western Ontario, RBC Financial Group Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers 20043, University of Western Ontario, RBC Financial Group Economic Policy Research Institute. [Downloadable!]
  7. Daniel Brou & Michele Ruta, 2007. "Rent Seeking, Market Structure and Growth," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/03, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
  8. Douhan, Robin & Henrekson, Magnus, 2007. "The Political Economy of Entrepreneurship: An Introduction," Working Paper Series 688, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? A tutorial is available.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.