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Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems

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Author Info
MASSIMO MORELLI
Abstract

I introduce a model of representative democracy with strategic parties, strategic candidates, strategic voters and multiple districts. If policy preferences are similar across districts and not too concentrated within districts, then the number of effective parties is larger under proportional representation (PR) than under plurality, and both electoral systems determine the median voter's preferred policy. However, for more asymmetric distributions of preferences the Duvergerian predictions can be "reversed", and the policy outcome with PR is more moderate than the one with plurality. Sincere voting induces more party formation, and strategic voting can be observed more often under PR. Copyright 2004 The Review of Economic Studies Ltd.

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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 71 (2004)
Issue (Month): (07)
Pages: 829-853
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:71:y:2004:i::p:829-853

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  1. Matias Iaryczower & Andrea Mattozzi, 2008. "Ideology and Competence in Alternative Electoral Systems," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002387, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Leonardo Felli & Antonio Merlo, 2001. "Endogenous Lobbying," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-043, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Guillaume R., FRECHETTE & Franois, MANIQUET & Massimo, MORELLI, 2006. "IncumbentsÕ Interests, VotersÕ Bias and Gender Quotas," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006042, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Iaryczower, Matias, . "Contestable leaderships: Party discipline and vote buying in legislatures," Working Papers 1255, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  5. Elena Panova, 2008. "Campaign Promises and Political Factions," Cahiers de recherche 0801, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
  6. Eguia, Jon X., 2006. "Voting blocs, coalitions and parties," Working Papers 1257, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  7. Francois Maniquet & Massimo Morelli & Guillaume Frechette, 2005. "Endogenous Affirmative Action: Gender Bias Leads to Gender Quotas," Economics Working Papers 0051, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
  8. Piolatto, Amedeo, 2008. "Electoral systems and the distortion of voters' preferences," MPRA Paper 12610, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Jan 2009. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Anesi, Vincent & De Donder, Philippe, 2007. "Party Formation and Racism," IDEI Working Papers 450, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Kalyan Chatterjee & Tomas Sjostrom, 2009. "Pre-Electoral Coalitions and Post-Election Bargaining," Discussion Papers 09-10, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham. [Downloadable!]
  11. Micael Castanheira & Benoît S. Crutzen & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2008. "The Impact of Party Organization on Electoral Outcomes," ECARES Working Papers 2008_016, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Ecares. [Downloadable!]
  12. Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Political Careers or Career Politicians?," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-032, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Samuel Merrill & James Adams, 2007. "The effects of alternative power-sharing arrangements: Do “moderating” institutions moderate party strategies and government policy outputs?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 413-434, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Guillaume R. Frhette & Franis Maniquet & Massimo Morelli, 2007. "Incumbents' interests and gender quotas," Discussion Papers 0708-06, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005. [Downloadable!]
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