Monopoly Power and Distribution in Fragmented Markets: The Case of Groundwater

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Monopoly Power and Distribution in Fragmented Markets: The Case of Groundwater

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HANAN G. JACOBY
RINKU MURGAI
SAEED REHMAN

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Hanan Jacoby

Abstract

This paper examines monopoly power in the market for groundwater (irrigation water extracted by private tubewells), a market characterized by barriers to entry and spatial fragmentation. In Pakistan's Punjab region, groundwater and tenancy contracts are often interlinked, with share-tenants gaining access to water through the use of their landlord's tubewell. An analysis of groundwater transactions shows that tenants of tubewell owners are charged lower prices than other customers. Tubewell owners and their tenants also use considerably more groundwater on their plots than other farmers. Using detailed price and quantity data, the efficiency and distributional implications of this monopoly power are explored. Copyright 2004 The Review of Economic Studies Ltd.

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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 71 (2004)
Issue (Month): (07)
Pages: 783-808
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:71:y:2004:i::p:783-808

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Paper
- Jacoby, Hanan G. & Murgai, Rinku & Rehman, Saeed Ur, 2001. "Monopoly power and distribution in fragmented markets : the case of groundwater," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2628, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]

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Basu, Kaushik & Bell, Clive, 1991. "Fragmented duopoly : Theory and applications to backward agriculture," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 145-165, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Other versions:
- Ethan Ligon & Jonathan P Thomas & Tim Worrall, 1997. "Informal Insurance Arrangements in Village Economies," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 9705, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm.
- Ligon, Ethan & Thomas, Jonathan P. & Worrall, Tim, 1997. "Informal insurance arrangements in village economies," CUDARE Working Paper Series 825, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy.
Tushaar Shah, & Intizar Hussain & Saeed ur Rehman, 2000. "Irrigation Management in Pakistan and India: Comparing Notes on Institutions and Policies," IWMI Working Papers H027088, International Water Management Institute. [Downloadable!]
Kenneth M. Kletzer & Brian D. Wright, 2000. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 621-639, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
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repec:wuk:andedp:9705 is not listed on IDEAS
Meinzen-Dick, Ruth Suseela, 1996. "Groundwater markets in Pakistan: participation and productivity," Research reports 105, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). [Downloadable!]
Basu, Kaushik, 1987. "Disneyland monopoly, interlinkage and usurious interest rates," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 1-17, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
John C. Driscoll & Aart C. Kraay, 1998. "Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation With Spatially Dependent Panel Data," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(4), pages 549-560, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Banerji A, 2007. "Groundwater Irrigation in North India: Institutions and Markets," Working Papers id:899, esocialsciences.com. [Downloadable!]
Azam, Jean-Paul & Rinaudo, Jean-Daniel, 2004. "Encroached Entitlements: Corruption and Appropriation of Irrigation Water in Southern Punjab (Pakistan)," IDEI Working Papers 252, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
A.Banerji & Gauri Khanna & J.V. Meenakshi, 2006. "Markets, Institutions And Efficiency Groundwater Irrigation In North India," Working papers 152, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Toshihiro Okubo, . "Anti-agglomeration Subsidies with Heterogeneous Firms," HEI Working Papers 15-2006, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies. [Downloadable!]

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