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Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games

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Author Info
Olivier Compte
Philippe Jehiel

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Abstract

This paper identifies a source of gradualism in bargaining andcontribution games. In the bargaining games we examine, each partycan opt out at any time, and the outside option outcome is assumed todepend on the offers made in the negotiation phase. Specifically, we assumethat (1) making a concession in the negotiation phase increases the otherparty's outside option pay-off and (2) the outside option outcome inducesan efficiency loss as compared with a negotiated agreement. The mainfinding is that the mere presence of such history-dependent outside optionsforces equilibrium concessions in the negotiation phase to be gradual,and the degree of gradualism is characterized. The model also applies tocontribution games in which the outside option may be interpreted as theoption to implement a partial project using the total contributions made sofar. Copyright The Review of Economic Studies Limited, 2004.

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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 71 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 975-1000
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:71:y:2004:i:4:p:975-1000

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  1. Paul Schweinzer, 2006. "Sequential bargaining with pure common values," Discussion Papers 137, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Shingo Ishiguro, 2007. "Holdup, Search and Inefficiency," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 07-13, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP). [Downloadable!]
  3. Philippe Jehiel & Oliver Compte, 2007. "Bargaining with Reference Dependent Preferences," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001552, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Clara Ponsati & Adamuz & Mercedes, 2004. "Arbitration Systems and Negotiations," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 118, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Tore Ellingsen & Topi Miettinen, 2007. "Disagreement and Authority," Jena Economic Research Papers in Economics 2007-037, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Thueringer Universitaets- und Landesbibliothek. [Downloadable!]
  6. Joan Esteban & Jozsef Sakovics, 2005. "A theory of agreements in the shadow of conflict," ESE Discussion Papers 139, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
  7. Duozhe Li, 2004. "Bargaining with History Dependent Preferences," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 516, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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