Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions

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Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions

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Peter Norman

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Peter Norman

Abstract

Constrained efficient provision of an excludable public good is studied in amodel where preferences are private information. The provision level isasymptotically deterministic, making it possible to approximate the optimalmechanism with a mechanism that provides a fixed quantity of the goodand charges fixed user fees for access. In general, the fixed fees involvethird degree price discrimination, but, if names are uninformative aboutpreferences, the analysis provides a justification for average cost pricing. Copyright The Review of Economic Studies Limited, 2004.

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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 71 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 1163-1188
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:71:y:2004:i:4:p:1163-1188

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Paper
- Norman,P., 2000. "Efficient mechanisms for public goods with use exclusions," Working papers 15, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems. [Downloadable!]

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Behringer, Stefan, 2008. "The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and a Large Number of Agents," MPRA Paper 11796, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Stefan Behringer, 2005. "The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and Large Number of Agents," JEPS Working Papers 05-007, JEPS.
Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2008. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods," NBER Working Papers 13797, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2003. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1441R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Apr 2006. [Downloadable!]
Martin Hellwig, 2006. "The Provision and Pricing of Excludable Public Goods: Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing versus Bundling," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_21, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Hellwig, Martin, 2004. "The Provision and Pricing of Excludable Public Goods: Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing versus Bundling," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-02, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
- Hellwig, Martin F., 2007. "The provision and pricing of excludable public goods: Ramsey-Boiteux pricing versus bundling," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 511-540, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2008. "Toward an Efficiency Rationale for the Public Provision of Private Goods," NBER Working Papers 13827, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2005. "Overcoming Participation Constraints," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1511R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Apr 2006. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2005. "Overcoming Participation Constraints," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1511, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
- Fang, Hanming & Norman, Peter, 2005. "Overcoming Participation Constraints," Micro Theory Working Papers norman-05-04-22-05-35-30, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 28 Apr 2005. [Downloadable!]
Fang, Hanming & Norman, Peter, 2004. "An Efficiency Rationale for Bundling of Public Goods," Micro Theory Working Papers norman-04-11-21-09-39-13, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 08 Feb 2005. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Peter Norman, 2004. "An Efficiency Rational for Bundling of Public Goods," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000084, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Fang,H. & Norman,P., 2003. "An efficiency rationale for bundling of public goods," Working papers 19, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems. [Downloadable!]
- Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2003. "An Efficiency Rationale for Bundling of Public Goods," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1441, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Hellwig, Martin, 2004. "Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-42, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
Martin Hellwig, 2009. "Utilitarian Mechanism Design for an Excludable Public Good," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_12, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
Felix Bierbrauer & Marco Sahm, 2008. "Optimal Democratic Mechanisms for Taxation and Public Good Provision," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_09, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
Martin Hellwig, 2004. "Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision and Public-Sector Pricing: A Contribution to the Foundations of Public Economics," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2004_14, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
SPRUMONT, Yves & MANIQUET, François, 2006. "Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: an Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach," Cahiers de recherche 2006-09, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
Felix Bierbrauer, 2006. "Collectively Incentive Compatible Tax Systems," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_24, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]

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