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Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment

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Author Info
Bruce Shearer
Abstract

Data from a field experiment are used to estimate the gain in productivity that is realized when workers are paid piece rates rather than fixed wages. The experiment was conducted within a tree-planting firm and provides daily observations on individual worker productivity under both compensation systems. Unrestricted statistical methods estimate the productivity gain to be 20%. Since planting conditions potentially affect incentives, structural econometric methods are used to generalize the experimental results to out-of-sample conditions. The structural results suggest that the average productivity gain, outside of the experimental conditions, would be at least 21.7%. Copyright The Review of Economic Studies Limited, 2004.

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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 71 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
Pages: 513-534
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:71:y:2004:i:2:p:513-534

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  1. Charles Bellemare & Bruce S. Shearer, 2006. "Sorting, Incentives and Risk Preferences: Evidence from a Field Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 2227, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  2. Bernard Fortin & Nicolas Jacquemet & Bruce Shearer, 2008. "Policy Analysis in the health-services market: accounting for quality and quantity," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00305309_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Patricia Crifo & Jean-Louis Rullière, 2004. "Incentives and Anonymity Principle: Crowding Out Toward Users," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  4. Thomas J. Dohmen, 2005. "Do Professionals Choke Under Pressure?," IZA Discussion Papers 1905, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  5. Jirjahn, Uwe & Kraft, Kornelius, 2008. "Teamwork and Intra-Firm Wage Dispersion among Blue-Collar Workers," IZA Discussion Papers 3291, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  6. Bandiera, Oriana & Barankay, Iwan & Rasul, Imran, 2009. "Social Incentives in the Workplace," IZA Discussion Papers 4190, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  7. Edward P. Lazear & Kathryn L. Shaw, 2007. "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources," NBER Working Papers 13653, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Karlan, Dean S. & Zinman, Jonathan, 2007. "Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 6182, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Charles Bellemare & Patrick Lepage & Bruce Shearer, 2009. "Peer Pressure, Incentives, and Gender: an Experimental Analysis of Motivation in the Workplace," Cahiers de recherche 0901, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Lorenz Goette & David Huffman, 2006. "Incentives and the Allocation of Effort Over Time: The Joint Role of Affective and Cognitive Decision Making," IZA Discussion Papers 2400, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  11. Sabrina Teyssier, 2008. "Les Modes de Rémunération comme MécanismesSélectifs de la Main d’oeuvre : Fondements Théoriques et Estimations Empiriques," Post-Print halshs-00303703_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  12. Sabrina Teyssier, 2008. "Les Modes de Rémunération comme Mécanismes Sélectifs de la Main d’oeuvre : Fondements Théoriques et Estimations Empiriques," Working Papers 0818, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.


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