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Public-Good Provision with Many Participants

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Martin F. Hellwig

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Abstract

For a nonexcludable public good with benefit and cost functions independent of the number of participants, this paper studies second-best allocations under Bayesian interim incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality. As the number of participants becomes large, second-best provision levels converge in distribution to first-best levels if the latter are bounded. Second-best provision levels become large in absolute terms but small relative to first-best levels if benefit and cost functions are isoelastic. In contrast, for an excludable public good, the ratio of second-best to first-best levels is bounded away from zero. Copyright The Review of Economic Studies Limited, 2003.

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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 70 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (07)
Pages: 589-614
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:70:y:2003:i:3:p:589-614

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  1. Norman, Peter & Fang, Hanming, 2004. "An Efficiency Rationale for Bundling of Public Goods," Micro Theory Working Papers norman-04-11-21-09-39-13, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 08 Feb 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Peter Postl, . "Efficient Compromising," Discussion Papers 06-11, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham. [Downloadable!]
  3. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2003. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1441R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Apr 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Felix Bierbrauer, 2006. "Distortionary Taxation and the Free-Rider Problem," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_6, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  5. Tilman Börgers & Peter Postl, 2005. "Efficient Compromising," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000188, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. repec:att:wimass:1920319 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Martin Hellwig, 2006. "The Provision and Pricing of Excludable Public Goods: Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing versus Bundling," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_21, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2008. "Toward an Efficiency Rationale for the Public Provision of Private Goods," NBER Working Papers 13827, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Tilman Börgers & Peter Postl, 2005. "Efficient Compromising," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000801, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Felix Bierbrauer & Marco Sahm, 2006. "Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_18, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  11. Felix Bierbrauer & Marco Sahm, 2006. "Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule," Discussion Papers 159, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  12. Felix Bierbrauer, 2006. "Collectively Incentive Compatible Tax Systems," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_24, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  13. Stefan Behringer, 2005. "The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and Large Number of Agents," JEPS Working Papers 05-007, JEPS. [Downloadable!]
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