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Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining

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  • Ilya Segal
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    Abstract

    This paper examines the profitability of three types of integration in a cooperative game solved by a random-order value ("e.g." the Shapley value). Collusion between players i and j is a contract merging their resources in the hands of one of them, say

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

    Volume (Year): 70 (2003)
    Issue (Month): 2 (04)
    Pages: 439-460

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:70:y:2003:i:2:p:439-460

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    Cited by:
    1. David de Meza & Mariano Selvaggi, 2004. "Exclusive Contracts Foster Relationship-Specific Investment," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/105, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    2. Chakrabarti, Subhadip & Tangsangasaksri, Supanit, 2011. "Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 55-64, July.
    3. Robert Gibbons, Editor & John Roberts, Editor, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9889.
    4. Peter Knudsen & Lars Ă˜sterdal, 2012. "Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 763-774, November.
    5. Francesco Passarelli, 2007. "Asymmetric Bargaining," ISLA Working Papers 26, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy, revised Jan 2007.
    6. Selvaggi, Marianao & Vasconcelos, Luis, 2006. "Star Wars: Exclusive Superstars and Collusive Outcomes," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp496, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.

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