1. Jean Tirole, 1985. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies," Working papers 363, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
2. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1995. "Organizational Diseconomies of Scale," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(3), pages 399-426, Fall.
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   • McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Organizational Diseconomies of Scale," Working Papers 728, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
3. Itoh Hideshi, 1993. "Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 410-427, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Meleu, Methieu, 1997. " Reciprocal Supervision, Collusion and Organizational Design," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 99(4), pages 519-40, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Mirrlees, J A, 1999. "The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 3-21, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, 2002. "Using Stock Price Information to Regulate Firms," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 69(1), pages 169-90, January.
7. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision," Micro Theory Working Papers celik-04-09-13-05-42-19, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 06 Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Celik, Gorkem, 2009. "Mechanism design with collusive supervision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 69-95, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Melumad, Nahum & Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1992. "A theory of responsibility centers," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 445-484, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Leonardo Felli, 1996. "Preventing Collusion Through Discretion," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 303, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
10. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, J David, 1998. "Centralized and Decentralized Contracts in a Moral Hazard Environment," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(4), pages 489-510, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Perez-Castrillo, J.D. & Macho-Stadler, I., 1992. "Centralized and Decentralized Contracts in a Moral Hazad Environment," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 179.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
11. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1998. "Collusion and Delegation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 280-305, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1995. "Collusion and Delegation," IDEI Working Papers 54, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    • Laffont, J.J. & Martimort, D., 1995. "Collusion and Delegation," Papers 95.397, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
12. Martimort, David, 1999. "The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(4), pages 929-47, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. M. Dewatripont & E. Maskin, 1995. "Contractual Contingencies and Renegotiation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 704-719, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
15. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1997. "Collusion under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 875-912, July.
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    • Laffont, J.J. & Martimort, D., 1996. "Collusion Under Asymmetric Information," Papers 95.389, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
16. Baliga, Sandeep & Sjostrom, Tomas, 1998. "Decentralization and Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 196-232, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    • Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1998. "Decentralization and Collusion," Discussion Papers 1210, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    • Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1996. "Decentralization and Collusion," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1757, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
17. Jacques Cremer & Michael H. Riordan, 1987. "On Governing Multilateral Transactions with Bilateral Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 436-451, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Jullien, Bruno, 2000. "Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 1-47, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    • Jullien, Bruno, 1997. "Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models," IDEI Working Papers 67, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
19. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1993. "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 629-56, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Nahum D. Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein, 1995. "Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 654-672, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Klaus M. Schmidt, 1990. "The Costs and Benefits of Privatization," Discussion Paper Serie A 287, University of Bonn, Germany.
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    • Schmidt,Klaus M., 1991. "The costs and benefits of privatization," Discussion Paper Serie A 330, University of Bonn, Germany.
22. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
23. Cramton, Peter C. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1990. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Working Papers 731, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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    • Peter Cramton & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1995. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Papers of Peter Cramton 95geb, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
    • Cramton Peter C. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 255-283, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
24. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Regulation of a Risk Averse Firm," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 149-173, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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1. repec:bep:dewple:2005-1-1132 is not listed on IDEAS
2. Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2008. "Optimal Contracts for Lenient Supervisors," Discussion Papers 237, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
3. Felgenhauer, Mike & Grüner, Hans Peter, 2007. "Safety Nets Within Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 6317, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Lucia Quesada, 2003. "Modeling collusion as an informed principal problem," Game Theory and Information 0304002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
5. Michael Kuhn & Qianhui Yan, 2006. "Quality Monitoring, Collusion and Sub-contracting," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 70, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics, Germany. [Downloadable!]
6. Michela Cella, 2005. "Monitoring Subcontracting in a Suppliers` Hierachy," Economics Series Working Papers 233, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
7. In-Uck Park & Chongwoo Choe, 2004. "Delegated Contracting and Corporate Hierarchies," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 14, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Choe, Chongwoo, 2002. "Delegated Contracting and Corporate Hierarchies," CEI Working Paper Series 2002-7, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
   • Choe, Chongwoo & Park, In-Uck, 2003. "Delegated Contracting and Corporate Hierarchies," CEI Working Paper Series 2003-23, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
8. Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2005. "Robustly collusion-proof implementation," Discussion Papers 0506-12, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2006. "Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(4), pages 1063-1107, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2006. "Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions," Discussion Papers 0506-22, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2007. "Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions," MPRA Paper 6098, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   • Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2007. "Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions," Discussion Papers 0708-05, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2009. "Optimal collusion-proof auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 565-603, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Hans K. Hvide & Tore Leite, 2003. "A Theory of Capital Structure with Strategic Defaults and Priority Violations," Finance 0311003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Hans K. Hvide & Todd Kaplan, 2003. "A Theory of Capital Structure with Strategic Defaults and Priority Violations," Microeconomics 0311001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
11. Chongwoo Choe & Shingo Ishiguro, 2009. "On The (Sub) Optimality Of Multi-Tier Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Motivation," Monash Economics Working Papers 18/08, Monash University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Choe, Chongwoo & Ishiguro, Shingo, 2008. "On the (Sub)optimality of Multi-tier Hierarchies: Coordination versus Motivation," MPRA Paper 13451, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
12. Scholz, Julia, 2008. "Auswirkungen vertikaler Kollusionsprobleme auf die vertragliche Ausgestaltung von Kreditverkäufen," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 4581, University of Munich, Munich School of Management. [Downloadable!]
13. Martimort, David & Verdier, Thierry, 2003. "The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth," IDEI Working Papers 170, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • David Martimort & Thierry Verdier, 2004. "The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(4), pages 1119-1141, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion," Micro Theory Working Papers celik-04-01-23-02-48-07, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 27 Jan 2008. [Downloadable!]
15. Chongwoo Choe & In-Uck Park, 2008. "Information Gathering, Delegated Contracting And Corporate Hierarchies," Monash Economics Working Papers 19/08, Monash University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
16. Jonathan Treussard, 2005. "Life-Cycle Consumption Plans and Portfolio Policies in a Heath-Jarrow-Morton Economy," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-033, Boston University - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
17. Dequiedt, Vianney & Martimort, David, 2004. "Delegated Monitoring versus Arm's Length Contracting," IDEI Working Papers 265, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Dequiedt, Vianney & Martimort, David, 2004. "Delegated monitoring versus arm's-length contracting," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(7), pages 951-981, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision," Micro Theory Working Papers celik-04-09-13-05-42-19, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 06 Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Celik, Gorkem, 2009. "Mechanism design with collusive supervision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 69-95, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Soenje Reiche, 2003. "Dynamic Yardstick Regulation," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 459, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
20. William N. Goetzmann & Vicente Pons-Sanz & S. Abraham Ravid, 2004. "Soft Information, Hard Sell: The Role of Soft Information in the Pricing of Intellectual Property," NBER Working Papers 10468, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Hvide, Hans K & Kaplan, Todd, 2003. "Delegated Job Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3907, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Reiche, Sönje Kerrin, 2003. "Dynamic Yardstick Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 4035, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)