I explore the idea that people care about the justifiability of their decisions in the context of two-person extensive games. Each player justifies his strategy s with a belief b of the opponent's strategy, which is consistent with the play path and maximally plausible (according to some exogenous criterion). We say that s is justifiable if against the ex post criticism that some other strategy s outperforms s against b, the player can argue that playing s would have exposed him to similar criticism in the opposite direction. Under a simplicity-based plausibility criterion, this concept implies systematic departures from maximizing behaviour in familiar games. Copyright 2002 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited
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Volume (Year): 69 (2002) Issue (Month): 3 (July) Pages: 691-706 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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