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Fault Tolerant Implementation

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Author Info
Eliaz, Kfir

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Abstract

In this paper we investigate the implementation problem arising when some of the players are "faulty" in the sense that they fail to act optimally. The planner and the non-faulty players only know that there can be at most k faulty players in the population. However, they know neither the identity of the faulty players, their exact number nor how faulty players behave. We define a solution concept which requires a player to optimally respond to the non-faulty players regardless of the identity and actions of the faulty players. We introduce a notion of fault tolerant implementation, which unlike standard notions of full implementation, also requires robustness to deviations from the equilibrium. The main result of this paper establishes that under symmetric information any choice rule that satisfies two properties--k-monotonicity and no veto power--can be implemented by a strategic game form if there are at least three players and the number of faulty players is less than 1/2n - 1. As an application of our result we present examples of simple mechanisms that implement the constrained Walrasian function and a choice rule for the efficient allocation of an indivisible good. Copyright 2002 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 69 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 589-610
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:69:y:2002:i:3:p:589-610

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  1. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-304, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  2. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2006. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-405, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Luis C. Corchon, 2007. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," Economics Working Papers we081207, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  4. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Implementation and Preference for Honesty," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-244, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  5. Heller, Yuval, 2005. "Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," MPRA Paper 7716, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Feb 2008. [Downloadable!]
  6. Antonio Cabrales & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics," Working Papers 2007-16, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Apr 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Honesty-Proof Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-178, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  9. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Universal Mechanisms and Moral Preferences in Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-254, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  10. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Stability and Implementation via Simple Mechanisms in the Complete Information Environments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-147, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  11. Jean-François Laslier & Jörgen Weibull, 2008. "Committee decisions: Optimality and Equilibrium," Working Papers halshs-00121741_v3, HAL. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Economics Working Papers 0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Saran, Rene, 2008. "The Maximal Domain for the Revelation Principle when Preferences are Menu Dependent," Research Memoranda 023, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  14. Joseph Y. Halpern, 2004. "A Computer Scientist Looks at Game Theory," Game Theory and Information 0411002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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