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Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Brusco, Sandro
Lopomo, Giuseppe
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Collusive equilibria exist in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with multiple objects, even with large complementarities in the buyers' utility functions. The bidders collude by dividing the objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. In the most collusive equilibrium the complementarities are never realized. The scope for collusion however narrows as the ratio between the number of bidders and the number of objects increases. Copyright 2002 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited
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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies .
Volume (Year): 69 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 407-36
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