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Screening in a Matching Market

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Author Info
Inderst, Roman
Abstract

Contract design under incomplete information is often analysed in a bilaterally monopolistic setting. If the informed party's reservation value does not depend on its private information (its type), it is a standard result that the uninformed side offers "low" types distorted contracts to reduce the information rent left to "high" types. We challenge this result by embedding contract design in a matching market environment. We consider a market where players meet pairwise and where, in each match, either side may be chosen to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. As frictions become sufficiently low, we find that the set of equilibria is independent of whether there is complete or incomplete information. In particular, all contracts are free of distortions. Copyright 2001 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited

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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 68 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 849-68
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:68:y:2001:i:4:p:849-68

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0034-6527

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  1. Aleksander Berentsen & Guillaume Rocheteau, 2004. "Money and Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(4), pages 915-944, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Jérome Pouyet & Bernard Salanié & Francois Salanié, 2008. "On Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 8(1). [Downloadable!]
  3. Shingo Ishiguro, 2007. "Holdup, Search and Inefficiency," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 07-13, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP). [Downloadable!]
  4. Silvia Sonderegger, 2004. "Nonlinear Pricing and Multimarket Duopolists," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/110, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
  5. Hao Li, 2003. "Price Discrimination in Matching Markets," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000028, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao, 2005. "Price Discrimination and Efficient Matching," Micro Theory Working Papers damiano-05-03-21-12-21-58, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 22 Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Matthew Baker & Ingmar Nyman, 2009. "Competitive Pressure and Lying in Search Markets," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 426, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger M, 2002. "Venture Capital Contracts and Market Structure," CEPR Discussion Papers 3203, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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