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Constitutional Rules of Exclusion in Jurisdiction Formation

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Author Info
Jehiel, Philippe
Scotchmer, Suzanne

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Abstract

The rules under which jurisdictions (nations, provinces) can deny immigration or expel residents are generally governed by a constitution, but there do not exist either positive or normative analyses to suggest what types of exclusion rules are best. We stylize this problem by suggesting four constitutional rules of admission: free mobility, admission by majority vote, admission by unanimous consent, and admission by a demand threshold for public goods. In a simple model we characterize the equilibria that result from these rules, and provide a positive theory for which constitutional rules will be chosen. Copyright 2001 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 68 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 393-413
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:68:y:2001:i:2:p:393-413

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0034-6527

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  3. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Le Breton, Michel & Savvateev, Alexei & Weber, Shlomo, 2006. "Stability under Unanimous Consent, Free Mobility and Core," IDEI Working Papers 413, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Le Breton, Michel & Savvateev, Alexei & Weber, Shlomo, 2006. "Heterogeneity Gap in the Stable Jurisdiction Structures," IDEI Working Papers 412, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  13. BOGOMOLNAIA, Anna & LE BRETON, Michel & SAVVATEEV, Alexei & WEBER, Shlomo, 2006. "Stability under unanimous consent, free mobility and core," CORE Discussion Papers 2006007, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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  19. Shlomo Weber & Michel Le Breton, 2001. "The Art of Making Everybody Happy: How to Prevent a Secession," IMF Working Papers 01/176, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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  21. Anna Bogomolnaia & Michel Breton & Alexei Savvateev & Shlomo Weber, 2008. "Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 525-543, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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