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A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States

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Author Info
Blouin, Max R
Serrano, Roberto

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Abstract

We analyse a market where (i) trade proceeds by random and anonymous pairwise meetings with bargaining; (ii) agents are asymmetrically informed about the value of the traded good; and (iii) no new entrants are allowed once the market is open. We show that information revelation and efficiency are never obtained in equilibrium, even as discounting is removed. This holds whether the asymmetry is two-sided or one-sided. In some cases there exist equilibria where a substantial amount goes untraded. This contrasts with the earlier literature, which was based on the steady-state equilibria of a model where agents enter the market every period. Copyright 2001 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 68 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 323-46
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:68:y:2001:i:2:p:323-46

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Milgrom, Paul R, 1981. "Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 921-43, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Serrano, Roberto & Yosha, Oved, 1996. "Welfare Analysis of a Market with Pairwise Meetings and Asymmetric Information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 167-75, June.
  3. Bergemann, Dirk & Valimaki, Juuso, 1996. "Learning and Strategic Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(5), pages 1125-49, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Gale, Douglas M, 1986. "Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 785-806, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Gale, Douglas M, 1986. "Bargaining and Competition Part II: Existence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 807-18, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1133-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Rothschild, Michael, 1974. "A two-armed bandit theory of market pricing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 185-202, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Serrano, Roberto & Yosha, Oved, 1993. "Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings: The One Sided Information Case," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 481-99, July.
  9. Oved Yosha & Roberto Serrano, 1996. "Welfare analysis of a market with pairwise meetings and asymmetric information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 167-175.
  10. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1997. "The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1247-1282, November.
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  12. Wilson, Robert, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(3), pages 511-18, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Gale, Douglas, 1987. "Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 20-54, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1993. "Sequential Bargaining and Competition," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 353-63, April.
  16. Wolinsky, Asher, 1990. "Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(1), pages 1-23, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Milgrom, Paul R, 1979. "A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 679-88, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Bargaining," Working Papers 2007-06, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
  2. Shneyerov, Art & Wong, Adam Chi Leung, 2007. "The Rate of Convergence to Perfect Competition of a Simple Matching and Bargaining Mechanism," Micro Theory Working Papers shneyerov-07-05-01-03-43-, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 01 May 2007. [Downloadable!]
  3. Diego Moreno & John Wooders, 2001. "The Efficiency Of Decentralized And Centralized Markets For Lemons," Economics Working Papers we014005, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  4. Tanguy, ISAAC, 2006. "Information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings : dynamic case with constant entry flow," Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Working Paper 2006026, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
  5. Max Blouin, 2001. "Equilibrium in a Decentralized Market with Adverse Selection," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 128, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal, revised Mar 2001. [Downloadable!]
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