Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Constitutional Choices

Contents:

Author Info

  • Perroni, Carlo
  • Scharf, Kimberly A

Abstract

This paper examines how capital tax competition affects jurisdiction formation. We describe a non-cooperative locational model of public goods provision choices, where the levels of taxation and the local public good varieties provided within jurisdictions are selected by majority voting, and where equilibrium jurisdictions consist of consumers with similar tastes. We show that interjurisdictional tax competition results in an enlargement of jurisdictional boundaries, and, even in the absence of intrajurisdictional transfers, can raise welfare for all members of a jurisdiction. Copyright 2001 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 68 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 133-54

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:68:y:2001:i:1:p:133-54

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0034-6527

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0034-6527

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. De Donder, Philippe & Le Breton, Michel & Peluso, Eugenio, 2010. "Majority Voting in Multidimensional Policy Spaces: Kramer-Shepsle versus Stackelberg," IDEI Working Papers 593, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  2. Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2003. "The Art of Making Everybody Happy : How to Prevent a Secession," IDEI Working Papers 164, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  3. Christian Roessler, 2006. "Public Good Menus and Feature Complementarity," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 962, The University of Melbourne.
  4. Pal, Rupayan & Sharma, Ajay, 2013. "Endogenizing governments' objectives in tax competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 570-578.
  5. Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009. "Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах
    [ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION O
    ," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Lin, Haixia, 2006. "Natural Amenities, Income Mix, and Endogenous Community Characteristics," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21263, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  7. Carl Gaigné & Stéphane Riou & Jacques-François Thisse, 2013. "How to make the metropolitan area work ? Neither big government, nor laissez-faire," Working Papers halshs-00816405, HAL.
  8. Brülhart, Marius & Jametti, Mario, 2007. "Does Tax Competition Tame the Leviathan?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6512, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Kothenburger, Marko, 2004. "Tax competition in a fiscal union with decentralized leadership," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 498-513, May.
  10. Haimanko, Ori & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2005. "Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1277-1303, July.
  11. De Donder, Philippe & Le Breton, Michel & Peluso, Eugenio, 2009. "On the (Sequential) Majority Choice of Public Good Size and Location," CEPR Discussion Papers 7223, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Ihori, Toshihiro & Yang, C.C., 2009. "Interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition: The optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 210-217, November.
  13. Rupayan Pal & Ajay Sharma, 2011. "Competition for foreign capital: Endogenous objective, public investment and tax," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2011-021, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
  14. Rupayan Pal & Ajay Sharma, 2011. "Political competition and leadership in tax competition," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2011-024, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
  15. LE BRETON, Michel & WEBER, Shlomo, 2001. "The art of making everybody happy: how to prevent a secession," CORE Discussion Papers 2001011, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:68:y:2001:i:1:p:133-54. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.