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Optimal Multi-object Auctions

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Author Info
Armstrong, Mark

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Abstract

This paper analyses optimal auctions of several objects. In the first model bidders have a binary distribution over their valuations for each object, in which case the optimal auction is efficient. The optimal auction takes one of two formats: either objects are sold in independent auctions, or a degree of bundling is introduced in the sense that the probability a bidder wins one object is increasing in her value for the other. The format of the optimal auction may depend upon the number of bidders. In the second model the restriction to binary distributions is relaxed, and the optimal auction is then inefficient. Copyright 2000 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 67 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 455-81
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:67:y:2000:i:3:p:455-81

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  1. Estelle Cantillon, 2002. "Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000091, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2006. "Procurement When Price and Quality Matter," Working Papers 06-24, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2004. "Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000385, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Lu, Jingfeng, 2006. "Endogenous entry and auctions design with private participation costs," MPRA Paper 934, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Veronika Grimm, 2006. "Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement," Working Paper Series in Economics 27, University of Cologne, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Jehiel, Philippe & Meyer-Ter-Vehn, Moritz & Moldovanu, Benny, 2006. "Mixed Bundling Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5566, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu, 2006. "Mixed Bundling Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001123, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu, 2006. "Mixed Bundling Auctions," Discussion Papers 141, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    • Jehiel, Philippe & Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz & Moldovanu, Benny, 2007. "Mixed bundling auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 494-512, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Domenico Menicucci, 2001. "Optimal two-object auctions with synergies," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 18-2001, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Antonio Miralles, 2005. "Auction theory, sequential local service privatization, and the effects of geographical scale economies on effective competition," Working Papers in Economics 132, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia. [Downloadable!]
  9. Nicolas Figueroa & Vasiliki Skreta, 2006. "The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000140, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory," Microeconomics 0004009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Cantillon, Estelle & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2007. "Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6083, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1999. "A Note on Revenue Maximization and Efficiency in Multi-Object Auctions," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-73, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Nicolás Figueroa & Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design," Documentos de Trabajo 231, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
  14. Asker, John & Cantillon, Estelle, 2005. "Optimal Procurement When Both Price and Quality Matter," CEPR Discussion Papers 5276, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1998. "The Optimality of Being Efficient," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpoe, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 18 Jun 1999. [Downloadable!]
  16. Juan Feng, 2004. "Optimal Allocation Mechanisms When Bidders Ranking for the objects is common," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 545, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  17. Ausubel, Lawerence M. & Cramton, Peter, 1998. "The optimality of being efficient : designing auctions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1985, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  18. Eugenio J. Miravete, 2001. "Screening Through Bundling," Penn CARESS Working Papers 3b8e0b3847b08b90e8570987c, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  19. Vasiliki Skreta, 2005. "Optimal Auction Design for Multiple Objects with Externalities," UCLA Economics Online Papers 345, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  20. DeMartini, Christine & Kwasnica, Anthony M. & Ledyard, John O. & Porter, David, 1998. "A New and Improved Design For Multi-Object Iterative Auctions," Working Papers 1054, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  21. Charles Zheng, 2000. "Optimal Auction in a Multidimensional World," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0296, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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