The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
AbstractWe present a model of anonymous collective bargaining where individuals' preferences and information may be significantly interdependent. We show that the bargaining outcome becomes independent of individuals' preferences and information as the bargaining group increases in size. As a corollary, we show that anonymous voluntary bargaining completely fails in large groups. Either the difference between the bargaining outcome and the status quo vanishes as the size of the group becomes larger, or, the bargaining becomes coercive and results in a violation of at least some individuals' rights. The result provides a rationale for the inherent difficulty of reform in the presence of asymmetric information. Copyright 2000 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 67 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0034-6527
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