Each player in an infinite population interacts strategically with a finite subset of that population. Suppose each player's binary choice in each period is a best response to the population choices of the previous period. When can behaviour that is initially played by only a finite set of player spread to the whole population? This paper characterizes when such contagion is possible for arbitrary local interaction systems. Maximal contagion occurs when local interaction is sufficiently uniform and there is low neighbour growth, i.e. the number of players who can be reached in k steps does not grow exponentially in k. Copyright 2000 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited
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Volume (Year): 67 (2000) Issue (Month): 1 (January) Pages: 57-78 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Stephen Morrs, .
""Contagion'',"
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97-01, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
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Sebastian Edwards, 2002.
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in: Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, pages 21-76
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Allen, Franklin & Gale, Douglas, 1998.
"Financial Contagion,"
Working Papers
98-33, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal & Matthew O. Jackson & Fernando Vega-Redondo & Leeat Yariv, 2008.
"Network Games,"
Economics Working Papers
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