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Voting as Communicating

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Author Info
Piketty, Thomas

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Abstract

This paper develops a model where voters trade-off two different motives when deciding how to vote: they care about current decision-making (they are "strategic"), but they also care about communicating their views about their most-preferred candidate so as to influence future elections, by influencing other voters' opinion and/or party positioning. In effect, voters in this model are intermediate between "strategic" and "sincere" voters of conventional models in elections with more than 2 candidates. This allows us to better investigate the relative efficiency of various electoral systems: our main conclusion is that since voting is used as a communication device electoral systems should be designed to facilitate efficient communication, e.g. by opting for 2-round systems rather than 1-round systems. Copyright 2000 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 67 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 169-91
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:67:y:2000:i:1:p:169-91

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  1. Monika Bütler & Michel André Maréchal, 2007. "Framing Effects in Political Decision Making: Evidence From a Natural Voting Experiment," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2007 2007-04, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Jan Fidrmuc & Orla Doyle, 2004. "Voice of the Diaspora: An Analysis of Migrant Voting Behavior," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-714, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Micael Castanheira, . "Why Vote for Losers?," Working Papers 125, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Roland, Gerard, 2003. "New governance of Europe: Parliamentary or presidential?, The," IESE Research Papers D/503, IESE Business School. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ganna Pogrebna & Pavlo Blavatskyy, 2009. "Coordination, focal points and voting in strategic situations: a natural experiment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 125-143, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Jean-Marie Baland & James A. Robinson, 2006. "Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile," NBER Working Papers 12517, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Roger B. Myerson, 2000. "Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0686, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Matias Iaryczower, 2008. "Strategic Voting in Sequential Committees," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002394, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Hans Gersbach, 2002. "Democratic Mechanisms: Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Ganna Pogrebna & Pavlo Blavatskyy, 2009. "Coordination, focal points and voting in strategic situations: a natural experiment," IEW - Working Papers iewwp403, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  11. Ianni, A. & Corradi, V., 2000. "Consensus, Contagion and Clustering in a Space-Time Model of Public Opinion Formation," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0009, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton. [Downloadable!]
  12. Anouk Riviere, 2003. "Comparing Electoral Systems: A Geometric Analysis," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 03/6, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Dec 2003. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2008. "One person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," ECARES Working Papers 2008_017, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Ecares. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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