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Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory

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Author Info
Mariotti, Marco

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Abstract

The Suppes-Sen dominance relation is a weak criterion of impartiality in distributive justice. I propose its application to Nash bargaining theory. The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is characterized by replacing the controversial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom with an axiom embodying the Suppes-Sen principle. This allows a clear interpretation of the NBS as a fair arbitration scheme. In addition, the proposed characterization is more robust than the standard one with respect to variations in the domain of bargaining problems. Copyright 1999 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 66 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 733-41
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:66:y:1999:i:3:p:733-41

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Roth, Alvin E, 1979. "Proportional Solutions to the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 775-77, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Thomson, A., 1989. "The Consistency Principle," RCER Working Papers 192, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  3. Myerson, Roger B, 1981. "Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 883-97, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Yongsheng Xu & Naoki Yoshihara, 2004. "Nonconvex Bargaining Problems," Discussion Paper Series a454, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2000. "A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution," Economic theory and game theory 018, Nir Dagan, revised 21 Sep 2000. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Dillenberger, David & Sadowski, Philipp, 2008. "Ashamed to be Selfish," MPRA Paper 8343, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2008. "Alternative Characterizations of the Proportional Solution for Nonconvex Bargaining Problems with Claims," Discussion Paper Series a501, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle, 2005. "Bargaining In Committees Of Representatives: The Optimal Voting Rule," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-24, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
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