In the last few years, a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the heading of 'incomplete contracting.' However, almost since its inception, the theory has been under attack for its lack of rigorous foundations. In this paper, the authors evaluate some of the criticisms that have been made of the theory, in particular, those in E. Maskin and J. Tirole (1999). In doing so, they develop a model that provides a rigorous foundation for the idea that contracts are incomplete. Copyright 1999 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.) This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.