The Selection of Preferences through Imitation
AbstractThe paper presents a model in which a population of agents repeatedly play games against nature; the rules of behavior followed are revised over time through a process of imitation. For binary decisions, imitation selects rules consistent with a preference relation of the kind proposed by SSB utility theory and regret theory. In general, this preference relation need not satisfy either independence or transitivity; the authors state conditions on imitation necessary for it to do so. For decisions over three or more options, the long-run tendency is for options that are maximally preferred in terms of SSB preferences to be chosen. If no maximally preferred option exists, the process of imitation may not converge. Copyright 1998 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 65 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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