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Polarization and Inefficient Policies

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Author Info
Schultz, Christian

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Abstract

Two parties have different goals. Voters, but not parties, are uncertain about the functioning of the economy, in this case the costs of producing a public good. The parties each propose a policy, an election is held and the policy of the winning party is implemented. Voters and parties care about the level of the public good and costs. Two kinds of sequential equilibria exist; revealing, where voters learn the true costs and the implemented policy adjusts to costs, and non-revealing. If parties' preferences are polarized, only non-revealing equilibria fulfill a refinement criterion like the intuitive criterion. If they are alike, only revealing equilibria fulfill this criterion. Thus, less political polarization improves information revelation. Copyright 1996 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 63 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 331-44
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:63:y:1996:i:2:p:331-44

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  1. Silvia Dominguez Martinez & Otto H. Swank, 2004. "Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-035/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Aleksander Berentsen & Esther Bruegger & Simon Loertscher, 2008. "Learning, public good provision, and the information trap," IEW - Working Papers iewwp371, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Cesar Martinelli & Akihiko Matsui, 2000. "Policy Reversals and Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Parties," Working Papers 0003, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM, revised Jul 2000. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Christian Schultz, 2003. "Information, Polarization and Delegation in Democracy," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Casamatta, Georges & De Paoli, Caroline, 2004. "Ex Post Inefficiency in a Political Agency Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 4275, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Cesar Martinelli & Akihiko Matsui, 1999. "Policy Reversals: Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Parties," Working Papers 9905, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM, revised Jan 2000. [Downloadable!]
  7. Felix Bierbrauer & Marco Sahm, 2006. "Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_18, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  8. Felix Bierbrauer & Marco Sahm, 2006. "Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule," Discussion Papers 159, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  9. Westermark, Andreas, 1999. "Extremism, Campaigning and Ambiguity," Working Paper Series 1999:9, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Westermark, Andreas, 2001. "Campaigning and Ambiguity when Parties Cannot Make Credible Election Promises," Working Paper Series 568, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Paul Heidhues & Johan Lagerlöf, 2000. "Hiding Information in Electoral Competition," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-06, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Feb 2002. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Luis Garicano & Tano Santos, 2004. "Referrals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 499-525, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    • Luis Garicano & Tano Santos, 2001. "Referrals," NBER Working Papers 8367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Carsten Helm & Michael Neugart, 2008. "Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 192, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (Department of Economics), Technische Universität Darmstadt (Darmstadt University of Technology). [Downloadable!]
  14. Tomer Blumkin & Volker Grossmann, 2004. "Ideological Polarization, Sticky Information, and Policy Reforms," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  15. Walter Bossert & William Schworm, 2007. "A Class of Two-Group Polarization Measures," Discussion Papers 2007-34, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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