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Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities

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Author Info
Jehiel, Philippe
Moldovanu, Benny

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Abstract

Externalities between buyers are shown to induce delays in negotiations between a seller and several buyers. Delays arise in a perfect and complete information setting with random matching even when there is no decline. While with a deadline the authors identify delays both for positive and negative externalities, without deadline they find that, when externalities are positive, there exists no subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies with bounded recall that exhibits delay; and when externalities are negative, it may happen that all subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium with bounded recall have the property that long periods of waiting alternate with short periods of activity: this is the cyclical delay phenomenon. Copyright 1995 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 62 (1995)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 619-37
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:62:y:1995:i:4:p:619-37

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  1. Wait, A., 2001. "Delays in Bargaining With Incompelete Contracts," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 809, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  2. Björnerstedt, Jonas & Westermark, Andreas, 2006. "Bargaining and Strategic Discrimination," Working Paper Series 2006:6, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Cecilia Testa, 2003. "Government Corruption and Legislative Procedures: is One Chamber Better Than Two?," STICERD - Development Economics Papers 41, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  4. Shingo Ishiguro, 2007. "Holdup, Search and Inefficiency," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 07-13, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP). [Downloadable!]
  5. Björnerstedt, Jonas & Westermark, Andreas, 2006. "Delay in Bargaining with Externalities," Working Paper Series 2006:29, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Paola Manzini & Clara Ponsati, 2003. "Stakeholders in Bilateral Conflict," Game Theory and Information 0311008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2000. "License Auctions and Market Structure," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 01-21, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Bargaining," Working Papers 2007-06, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
  9. P. Manzini & C. Ponsati, 2006. "Stakeholder bargaining games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 67-77, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Jonas Björnerstedt & Andreas Westermark, 2009. "The inefficiency of price quantity bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 301-332, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Bester, Helmut & Konrad, Kai A, 2003. "Delay in Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 3784, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Sempere-Monerris, JosŽ J. & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 1997. "Bargaining with Externalities: Licensing of an Innovation," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1997007, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
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