This paper examines the effects of the composition of unemployment on wage determination. It explores the implication of one central assumption: firms hire the worker who has been unemployed for the least amount of time. By embodying this assumption in a model of the labor market with job creation/destruction and matching, the joint behavior of unemployment, the distribution of unemployment durations, and wages are characterized. The implication that the reemployment prospects of employed workers, were they to become unemployed, are better than those of the currently unemployed appears to have been an important feature of European unemployment experience in the 1980s. Copyright 1994 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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