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Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms

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  • Ledyard, John O
  • Palfrey, Thomas R
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    Abstract

    This paper characterizes interim efficient mechanisms for public good production and cost allocation in a two-type environment with risk-neutral, quasi-linear preferences and fixed-size projects, where the distribution of the private good, as well as the public goods decision, affects social welfare. An efficient public good decision can always be accomplished by a majority voting scheme, where the number of 'YES' votes required depends on the welfare weights in a simple way. The results are shown to have a natural geometry and an intuitive interpretation. Copyright 1994 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

    Volume (Year): 61 (1994)
    Issue (Month): 2 (April)
    Pages: 327-55

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:61:y:1994:i:2:p:327-55

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    Cited by:
    1. Lagunoff, Roger, 1997. "On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1699-1725, August.
    2. Giovanni Maggi & Massimo Morelli, 2003. "Self Enforcing Voting in International Organizations," NBER Working Papers 10102, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Pérez-Nievas, Mikel, . "Interim efficient allocation mechanisms," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/7220, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
    4. R. J. Gary-Bobo & T. Jaaidane, 1996. "Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem," THEMA Working Papers 96-31, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    5. Gradstein, Mark, 1998. "Provision of public goods in a large economy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 229-234, November.
    6. Daniel McFadden, 2009. "The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 77-100, April.
    7. Søberg, Morten & Tangerås, Thomas P., 2003. "Voter Turnout in Direct Democracy: Theory and Evidence," Working Paper Series 596, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    8. Martin Besfamille & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2010. "NIMBY and mechanism design under different constitutional constraints," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 114-132, April.
    9. Pérez-Nievas, Mikel, . "Interim efficient mechanisms for a public decision making in a discrete framework," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/7221, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
    10. Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 153-171, February.
    11. Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2007. "A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 441-466, March.
    12. Helmut Bester & Karl Wärneryd, 2006. "Conflict and the Social Contract," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(2), pages 231-249, 07.

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