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Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods

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Author Info
Moulin, Herve

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Abstract

Under the 'conservative equal costs' mechanism to produce a nonexcludable public good, each agent reports his demand. The lowest reported demand is produced and its cost is shared equally among all agents. When the cost of producing the public good is convex, this mechanism is strategy-proof, anonymous, and induces voluntary participation. No other mechanism shares these three properties. When the public good is excludable, there is a mechanism with the same properties that everyone prefers to conservative equal costs. This mechanism excludes the agent with the lowest demand from consuming a larger amount of the good, ameliorating the free-rider problem. Copyright 1994 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 61 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 305-25
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:61:y:1994:i:2:p:305-25

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  1. José Alcalde & José Angel Silva, 2000. "- A Procedure For Sharing Recycling Costs," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-14, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  2. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Tomas Sjostrom & Takehiko Yamato, 2003. "Secure Implementation:Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Reconsidered," Discussion papers 03019, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). [Downloadable!]
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  3. Francois Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 2002. "Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good," Economics Working Papers 0014, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Russell Cooper & Dean Corbae, 2001. "Financial collapse and active monetary policy: a lesson from the Great Depression," Staff Report 289, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  5. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "Efficiency and Consistency for Locating Multiple Public Facilities," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200507, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2005. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Sean Gailmard & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2002. "An Experimental Comparison of Collective Choice Procedures for Excludable Public Goods," Working Papers 0214, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  7. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001022, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Branzei, R. & Inarra, E. & Tijs, S. & Zarzuelo, J.M., 2002. "Cooperation by asymmetric agents in a joint project," Discussion Paper 15, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  9. SPRUMONT, Yves & MOULIN, Hervé, 2005. "Fair Allocation of Production Externalities: Recent Results," Cahiers de recherche 2005-22, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
  10. Le Breton, Michel & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2006. "On the Equivalence of Coalitional and Individual Strategy-Proofness Properties," IDEI Working Papers 408, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  11. Luis Corchón & José Rueda-Llano, 2008. "Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 279-291, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. José Alcalde & José Angel Silva & María del Carmen Marco, 2002. "Bankruptcy Games And The Ibn Ezra'S Proposal," Working Papers. Serie AD 2002-28, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
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  13. Johan Eyckmans, 1999. "Strategy Proof Uniform Effort Sharing Schemes For Transfrontier Pollution Problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 14(2), pages 165-189, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Francois Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 2002. "Welfare Egalitarianism in Non-Rival Environments," Economics Working Papers 0016, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Michel Breton & Vera Zaporozhets, 2009. "On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 287-309, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Laura Razzolini & Michael Reksulak & Robert Dorsey, 2004. "An Experimental Evaluation of the Serial Cost Sharing Rule," Working Papers 0402, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Tomas Sjöström & Takehiko Yamato, 2004. "Secure Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000615, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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