The authors study a general implementation problem for exchange economies with a continuum of players and private information, and test the robustness of the results for sequences of approximating finite economies. Assuming that the designer knows the distribution of the characteristics in the economy, the authors consider continuous and unique implementation in both its equilibrium and dominant strategies versions and obtain results for general self-selective (first- and second-best) allocations. An upper hemicontinuity property of Bayesian equilibria of approximating economies for continuous mechanisms is demonstrated. Copyright 1993 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Edward J. Green & Ruilin Zhou, 2005.
"Money As A Mechanism In A Bewley Economy,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(2), pages 351-371, 05.
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