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Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships

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Author Info
Legros, Patrick
Matthews, Steven A

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Abstract

This paper shows in two ways that the degree to which free-riding diminishes the performance of deterministic partnerships may be less than has been generally thought. First, a necessary and sufficient condition is provided for a partnership to sustain full efficiency. It implies that many nontrivial partnerships sustain efficiency, such as generic ones with finite action spaces, and neoclassical ones with Leontief technologies. Second, approximate efficiency is shown to be achievable in a large class of partnerships, including ones with smooth and monotonic production and disutility functions. Copyright 1993 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 60 (1993)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 599-611
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:60:y:1993:i:3:p:599-611

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Radner, Roy, 1986. "Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(1), pages 43-57, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Legros, Patrick & Newman, Andrew F., 1996. "Wealth Effects, Distribution, and the Theory of Organization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 312-341, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Radner, Roy & Myerson, Roger & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(1), pages 59-69, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Eric Rasmusen, 1987. "Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 428-435, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Steven R. Williams & Roy Radner, 1988. "Efficiency in Partnership When The Joint Output is Uncertain," Discussion Papers 760, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  6. Legros, Patrick & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991. "Efficiency in partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 296-322, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., 1996. ""Basket" Cases: International Joint Ventures After the Tax Reform Act of 1986," NBER Working Papers 5755, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Dessein, Wouter & Garicano, Luis & Gertner, Robert, 2007. "Organizing for Synergies," CEPR Discussion Papers 6019, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Dennis Courtney & Thomas Marschak, 2009. "Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 7-43, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hauswald, Robert & Hege, Ulrich, 2003. "Ownership and Control in Joint Ventures: Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 4056, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Al Slivinski, 1999. "Team Incentives and Organizational Form," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9916, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Yuval Emek & Michal Feldman, 2007. "Computing an Optimal Contract in Simple Technologies," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000184, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Jianpei Li, 2009. "Team production with inequity-averse agents," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 119-136, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Berglöf, Erik & Burkart, Mike & Friebel, Guido & Paltseva, Elena, 2008. "Widening and Deepening: Reforming the European Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 6672, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Luis Garicano & Tano Santos, 2004. "Referrals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 499-525, June. [Downloadable!]
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    • Luis Garicano & Tano Santos, 2001. "Referrals," NBER Working Papers 8367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Alex Gershkov & Jianpei Li & Paul Schweinzer, 2006. "Collective Production and Incentives," Discussion Papers 186, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  11. Ichiro Obara, . "Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 399, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Makoto Hanazono, 2004. "Holdup with Subsidized Investment," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 640, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  13. Falconieri, S. & Palomino, F. & Sakovics, J., 2002. "Collective vs. individual sale of tv rights in league sports," Discussion Paper 106, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Mihir A. Desai & C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines Jr., 2002. "International Joint Ventures and the Boundaries of the Firm," NBER Working Papers 9115, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. repec:sfu:sfudps:dp00-03 is not listed on IDEAS
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  16. Debraj Ray & Jean-Marie Baland & Olivier Dagnelie, 2007. "Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects," Post-Print halshs-00160753_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Asheim, Geir B. & Yoo, Seung Han, 2007. "Coordinating under incomplete information," Memorandum 22/2007, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Oyer, Paul, 2001. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?," Research Papers 1686, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
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  19. Ichiro Obara & David Rahman, 2006. "Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000280, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  20. Erik Berglöf & Mike Burkart & Guido Friebel & Elena Paltseva, 2009. "Club-in-the-Club: Reform under Unanimity," EPRU Working Paper Series 2009-07, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  21. Yuval Emek & Michal Feldman, 2007. "Computing an Optimal Contract in Simple Technologies," Discussion Paper Series dp452, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  22. Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2002. "Evidence Disclosure and Verfiability," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2000-16R, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
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