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Efficient Sequential Bargaining

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Author Info
Ausubel, Lawrence M
Deneckere, Raymond J
Abstract

Suppose that a seller and a buyer have private valuations for a good and that their respective utilities from a trading mechanism are given by u(subscript 's') and u(subscript 'b'). Consider the problem of maximizing E[('lambda')u(subscript 's') + (1 - 'lambda')u(subscript 'b')] for some weight 'lambda' in the unit interval. It is shown that, if 'lambda' is sufficiently close to zero or one, then the maximum value of this objective function attainable by a static revelation mechanism can be arbitrarily closely approximated by equilibria of the sequential bargaining games in which only a single player makes offers. That is, the welfare bound implied by the revelation principle is virtually attainable in offer/counteroffer bargaining. Copyright 1993 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 60 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 435-61
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:60:y:1993:i:2:p:435-61

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  1. Joel Watson, 1995. "Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 94-13r, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Sanjeev Goyal, 1994. "On the possibility of efficient bilateral trade," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 79-102, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2006. "Bargaining for Bribes: The Role of Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5712, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999)," MPRA Paper 6973, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Xavier Jarque & Clara Ponsati & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication," ESE Discussion Papers 75, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Armando Gomes, . "Multiple Large Shareholders in Corporate Governance," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 5-99, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Clara Ponsati-obiols, 1997. "Compromise vs Capitulation in BArgaining with Incomplete Information," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 48, pages 09, Octobre-D. [Downloadable!]
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