AbstractThe cost of gathering information about unfamiliar securities may lead to gains from standardization: firms issue a particular security because it is used by other firms. To support standardization as an equilibrium phenomenon, information must be nontransferable (otherwise it might be revealed by prices or the observation of other agents' decisions) and it must be generic (useful in evaluating a number of securities). A competitive equilibrium in which standard contracts are used may be subject to coordination failure: while there always exists a constrained efficient equilibrium, there may also exist Pareto-ranked equilibria. Copyright 1992 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 59 (1992)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0034-6527
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Fulghieri, Paolo & Lukin, Dmitry, 2001. "Information production, dilution costs, and optimal security design," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 3-42, July.
- Bohn, Henning, 1995. "Towards a theory of incomplete financial markets A review essay," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 433-449, November.
- Jo Corkish & Allison Holland & Anne Fremault Vila, 1997. "The Determinants of Successful Financial Innovation: an Empirical Analysis of Futures Innovation on LIFFE," Bank of England working papers 70, Bank of England.
- Martin Hellwig, 2009.
"Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis,"
Springer, vol. 157(2), pages 129-207, June.
- Martin Hellwig, 2008. "Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_43, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Thomas H. Noe & Michael J. Rebello & Jun Wang, 2006.
"The Evolution of Security Designs,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 61(5), pages 2103-2135, October.
- Arnold, Marc & Schuette, Dustin & Wagner, Alexander, . "Pay Attention or Pay Extra: Evidence on the Compensation of Investors for the Implicit Credit Risk of Structured Products," Working Papers on Finance 1406, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance.
- Cantale, Salvatore & Russino, Annalisa, 2004. "Putable common stock," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(5), pages 753-775, November.
- Kawamura, Enrique, 2004.
"Investors's distrust and the marketing of new financial assets,"
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance,
Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 265-295, May.
- Enrique L. Kawamura, 2000. "Investor´s Distrust and the Marketing of New Financial Assets," Working Papers 23, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Apr 2004.
- Franks, Julian & Sussman, Oren, 2005. "Financial innovations and corporate bankruptcy," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 283-317, July.
- Ma, Xianghai, 1996. "Capital controls, market segmentation and stock prices: Evidence from the Chinese stock market," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 4(2-3), pages 219-239, July.
- Darrell Duffie, 2008. "Innovations in credit risk transfer: implications for financial stability," BIS Working Papers 255, Bank for International Settlements.
- H. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, .
"Innovation in Financial Services, Relationships and Risk Sharing,"
Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers
97-26, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1999. "Innovations in Financial Services, Relationships, and Risk Sharing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 45(9), pages 1239-1253, September.
- Rossetto, Silvia & Bommel, Jos van, 2009. "Endless leverage certificates," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1543-1553, August.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.