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The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

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Author Info
Kandori, Michihiro
Abstract

The present paper formalizes the idea that improved monitoring helps coordination in long-term relationships. Specifically, the pure-strategy sequential equilibrium payoff set is shown to expand (in the sense of set inclusion) in repeated games with imperfect monitoring when the quality of the signal improves in Blackwell's sense. Furthermore, the directions of the expansion are identified. Copyright 1992 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 59 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 581-93
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:59:y:1992:i:3:p:581-93

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  1. Jee-Hyeong Park, 2000. "Sustaining Free Trade with Imperfect Private Information about Non-Tariff Barriers," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1036, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  2. Kai-Uwe Kühn, 2005. "Collusion Theory in Search of Robust Themes: A Comment on Switgard Feuerstein's Survey," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 207-215, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Gamess," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-246, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. repec:att:wimass:1919988 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Masaki Aoyagi & Guillaume R. Frechette, 2004. "Collusion in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000127, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Holm, Håkan, 2000. "Politically Correct Information Adoption," Working Papers 2000:5, Lund University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (with M. Kandori)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 275, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 9809004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Jee-Hyeong Park, 2004. "Sustaining Free Trade with Imperfect Private Information about Non-Tariff Barriers," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 736, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  10. Kaplan, Todd & Ruffle, Bradley, 2007. "Which way to cooperate," MPRA Paper 3381, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  11. Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Frequent Monitoring in Repeated Games under Brownian Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 13104, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  12. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000009, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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