On Hierarchical Spatial Competition
AbstractIn this paper, the author considers a hierarchical model of spatial electoral competition with two dominant players (incumbents) and one entrant. The incumbents engage in a noncooperative game against each other and act as Stackelberg leaders with respect to a vote-maximizing entrant. The author proves that the equilibrium of this game, called a hierarchical equilibrium, exists and is unique for an arbitrary single-peaked distribution of voters' ideal points. Moreover, the author fully characterizes the set of equilibrium strategies and shows its equivalence to the set of strategies generated by a perfect-foresight equilibrium. Copyright 1992 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 59 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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