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On Hierarchical Spatial Competition

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Author Info
Weber, Shlomo
Abstract

In this paper, the author considers a hierarchical model of spatial electoral competition with two dominant players (incumbents) and one entrant. The incumbents engage in a noncooperative game against each other and act as Stackelberg leaders with respect to a vote-maximizing entrant. The author proves that the equilibrium of this game, called a hierarchical equilibrium, exists and is unique for an arbitrary single-peaked distribution of voters' ideal points. Moreover, the author fully characterizes the set of equilibrium strategies and shows its equivalence to the set of strategies generated by a perfect-foresight equilibrium. Copyright 1992 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 59 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 407-25
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:59:y:1992:i:2:p:407-25

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  1. Callander, Steven, 1999. "Electoral Competition with Entry," Working Papers 1083, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  2. Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2003. "The Art of Making Everybody Happy : How to Prevent a Secession," IDEI Working Papers 164, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  3. Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, 1998. "Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 149-175, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2007. "Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 229-245, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Shlomo Weber & Michel Le Breton, 2001. "The Art of Making Everybody Happy: How to Prevent a Secession," IMF Working Papers 01/176, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  6. K. Terai, 2003. "Electoral alliance and implemented redistribution: an interpretation on non-competitive politics of Japan," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 10(4), pages 235-238, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Stefan Lutz, 1997. "Vertical product differentiation and entry deterrence," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 79-102, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Mark Bagnoli & Ted Bergstrom, 2004. "Log-concave Probability and its Applications," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 1989D, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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