Disagreement in Markets with Matching and Bargaining
AbstractThis paper develops an explanation of why bargainers often terminate negotiations in disagreement in spite of positive expected gains from continued negotiations. The key to the analysis is a model that embeds bargaining activity within a market. Agents are continually faced with the choice between continuing to bargain with an existing partner or searching for a new partner. Bargainers may then terminate negotiations without an agreement, in spite of positive expected.gains from continued bargaining, because seeking a new bargaining partner promises a higher return. Copyright 1992 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 59 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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