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Contracts, Constraints and Consumption

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  • Green, Edward J
  • Oh, Soo-Nam

Abstract

This paper compares implications of three kinds of models of households' consumption behavior: the basic permanent-income model, several models of liquidity-constrained households, and a model of an informationally-constrained efficient contract. These models are distinguished in terms of implications regarding the present discounted values of net trades to households at various levels of temporary income, and the households' marginal rates of substitution. Martingale consumption is studied as an approximation to the predicted consumption process of the efficient-contract model. Copyright 1991 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 58 (1991)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
Pages: 883-99

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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:58:y:1991:i:5:p:883-99

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References

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  1. Atkeson, Andrew & Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1992. "On Efficient Distribution with Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 427-53, July.
  2. Robert E. Hall & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1982. "The Sensitivity of Consumption to Transitory Income: Estimates from Panel Data on Households," NBER Working Papers 0505, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Campbell, John Y & Deaton, Angus, 1989. "Why Is Consumption So Smooth?," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(3), pages 357-73, July.
  4. Fumio Hayashi, 1985. "Tests for Liquidity Constraints: A Critical Survey," NBER Working Papers 1720, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Townsend, Robert M., 1988. "Information constrained insurance : The revelation principle extended," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2-3), pages 411-450.
  6. Pischke, Jörn-Steffen, 1991. "Individual income, incomplete information, and aggregate consumption," ZEW Discussion Papers 91-07, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  7. Abhijit Banerjee & Andrew F. Newman, 1989. "Risk-Bearing and the Theory of Income Distribution," Discussion Papers 877, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Gale, Douglas & Hellwig, Martin, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 647-63, October.
  9. Allen, Franklin, 1985. "Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 27-31.
  10. Farmer, Roger E A, 1988. "Money and Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 431-46, July.
  11. Townsend, Robert M, 1982. "Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1166-86, December.
  12. Lillard, Lee A & Willis, Robert J, 1978. "Dynamic Aspects of Earning Mobility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(5), pages 985-1012, September.
  13. Robert E. Hall, 1987. "Consumption," NBER Working Papers 2265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Hall, Robert E, 1978. "Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(6), pages 971-87, December.
  15. Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1990. "Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 367-390, August.
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Cited by:
  1. Aiyagari, S. Rao & Williamson, Stephen, 1997. "Money, Credit, and Allocation Under Complete Dynamic Contracts and Incomplete Markets," Working Papers 97-20, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  2. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 1996. "Money is memory," Staff Report 218, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  3. Laurence Ales & Maziero Pricila, . "Accounting for Private Information," GSIA Working Papers 2010-E58, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  4. Dubois, Pierre, 2002. "Consommation, partage de risque et assurance informelle : développements théoriques et tests empiriques récents," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 78(1), pages 115-149, Mars.
  5. Lim, Y. & Townsend, R.M., 1997. "General Equilibrium Models of Financial Systems: Theory and Measurement in Village Economies," Papers 9716, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
  6. David Backus & Silverio Foresi & Liuren Wu, 2002. "Contagion in Financial Markets," Finance 0207009, EconWPA.
  7. Robert Townsend & Rolf Mueller, 1998. "Mechanism Design and Village Economies: From Credit, to Tenancy, to Cropping Groups," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(1), pages 119-172, January.
  8. Marcelo Bianconi, 2003. "Private Information, Growth and Asset Prices with Stochastic Disturbances," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0301, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
  9. Edward J. Green & Soo-Nam Oh, 1991. "Can a "credit crunch" be efficient?," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 3-17.
  10. Tongwook Park, 2000. "Optimal Social Security with Moral Hazard," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1265, Econometric Society.

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