A competitive, dynamic model of entry into a new industry is set up and both its positive and normative aspects are studied. The main assumptions are that entry is sequential, that it occurs under imperfect information on the size of the market, and that better information becomes available as time goes on. The major results reported here (under suitable restrictions) are that the equilibrium rate of entry is monotonically decreasing over time and that--at any given point in time--it is smaller than the socially optimal one. Copyright 1991 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Other versions of this item:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.) This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.