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On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents Are Not Identical

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Author Info
Emons, Winand
Sobel, Joel

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Abstract

This paper is about accidents involving two risk-neutral parties. Both parties engage in actions that are profitable but affect the magnitude of possible bilateral accidents. The authors analyze how the action choices can be decentralized by liability rules that assign the accident costs. If the authors allow for punitive damages, they can implement the first-best actions by a liability rule even if agents are not identical. Under this liability rule, some individuals may be in expectation better off in the event of an accident than in the event of no accident. The authors provide conditions under which this problem does not arise. Copyright 1991 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 58 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 375-90
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:58:y:1991:i:2:p:375-90

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  1. Ram Singh, 2006. "On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria Under Liability Rules," NBER Working Papers 12625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Dhammika Dharmapala & Sandra A. Hoffmann, 2002. "Bilateral Accidents with Intrinsically Interdependent Costs of Precaution," Working papers 2002-11, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. González, Patrick, 2003. "Optimal Assignment of Liabilities," Cahiers de recherche 0305, GREEN. [Downloadable!]
  4. Steven Shavell, 2005. "Liability for Accidents," NBER Working Papers 11781, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2004. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 307-327, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Ram Singh, 2008. "Risk, Informational Asymmetry and Product Liability; An enquiry into conflicting objectives," Working papers 164, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Ram Singh, 2004. "‘Full’ Compensation Criteria: An Enquiry into Relative Merits," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 223-237, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Hoffmann, Sandra & Schwartz, Warren & Dharmapala, Dhammika, 2001. "A Neglected Interdependency in Liability Theory," Discussion Papers dp-01-13, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
  9. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2000. "Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0211, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Patrick González, 2004. "Nash Implementable Liability Rules for Judgement-Proof Injurers," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-58, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  11. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit de Geest, 2004. "The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules," Working Papers 04-17, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Winand Emons, 2001. "Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony," Diskussionsschriften dp0103, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
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