Monopsony Wage Determination and Multiple Unemployment Equilibria in a Non-linear Search Model
AbstractThis paper extends the analysis of wage determination in a search environment to the case where firms employ numerous individuals and benefit from team production. It is shown that monopsony wage offers may display perverse comparative statics properties. Interesting problems then arise concerning the uniqueness of search equilibria. These problems are addressed in a simple equilibrium setting where it is shown that multiple equilibria may exist, with an equilibrium that displays bootstrap properties. The author's results suggest the possibility of explaining unsatisfactory equilibria as the consequence of profit-maximizing wage choices in environments with imperfectly coordinated trading. Copyright 1991 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 58 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0034-6527
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- Smith, Eric, 1994.
"Search, Concave Production, and Optimal Firm Size,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
882, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Daniel Cardona & Fernando Sanchez Losada, 2003. "Union Power, Minimum Wage Legislation, Endogenous Labor Supplies and Production," Working Papers in Economics 105, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
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