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A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation

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Author Info
Dutta, Bhaskar
Sen, Arunava

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Abstract

The main result of this paper is to characterize the class of two-person social choice correspondences which are Nash-implementable. The characterization result is used to formulate domain restrictions that allow the construction of nondictatorial and Pareto-efficient social choice correspondences that are Nash-implementable. Copyright 1991 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 58 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 121-28
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:58:y:1991:i:1:p:121-28

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  1. Sang-Chul Suh, 1994. "A mechanism implementing the proportional solution," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 301-317, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou, 2009. "Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 902, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Matthew O. Jackson, 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 966, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Eiichi Miyagawa, 2002. "Reduced-form implementation," Discussion Papers 0203-09, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Nash implementation and the bargaining problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 333-351, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen & Rajiv Vohra, 1994. "Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 173-203, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2006. "Full-Truthful Implementation in Nash Equilibria," ISER Discussion Paper 0672, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  10. Luis C. Corchon, 2007. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," Economics Working Papers we081207, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  11. Georgy Artemov, 2006. "Imminent Nash Implementation as a Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(14), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
  12. Ashraf-Ball, Hezlin & Oswald, Andrew J. & Oswald, James I., 2009. "Hydrogen Transport and the Spatial Requirements of Renewable Energy," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 903, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Bernarda Zamora & Pablo Amorós, 1998. "- Implementation Of Optimal Contracts Under Adverse Selection," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-25, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  14. İpek Özkal-Sanver & M. Sanver, 2006. "Nash implementation via hyperfunctions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 607-623, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen, 1994. "2-person Bayesian implementation," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 41-54, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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