1. Radner, Roy, 1986. "Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(1), pages 43-57, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1983. "Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 219, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1983. "Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 251-268, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. George Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession," Economics Working Papers 0054, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Egorov, Georgy & Sonin, Konstantin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession," CEPR Discussion Papers 5092, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1999. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Levine's Working Paper Archive 571, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Fudenberg, D., 1991. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Working papers 589, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1992. "Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(3), pages 561-79, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group cooperation," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000043, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Haag, Matthew & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 97, Royal Economic Society. [Downloadable!]
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Game Theory and Information 0209005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Working Papers 2003.54, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Wallis Working Papers WP33, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
   • Haag, Matthew & Lagunoff, Roger, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 650, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Haag, Matthew & Lagunoff, Roger, 2007. "On the size and structure of group cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 68-89, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Politics of Succession," Game Theory and Information 0505003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
5. D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 508, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1987. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player," Working papers 461, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1995. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 103, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 759-78, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. V.V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1989. "Sustainable plans and debt," Staff Report 125, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Chari V. V. & Kehoe Patrick J., 1993. "Sustainable Plans and Debt," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 230-261, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Valimaki, 2002. "Bad Reputation," Discussion Papers 1348, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jeffrey Ely & Jusso Valimaki, 2002. "Bad Reputation," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000514, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
   • Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Välimäki, 2003. "Bad Reputation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(3), pages 785-814, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Giulio Federico, 2004. "Samaritans, Rotten Kids and Policy Conditionality," Development and Comp Systems 0409004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
9. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 607, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1989. "An Approximative Folk Theorem With Imperfect Private Information," Working papers 525, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1991. "An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 26-47, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Christian Schultz, 2005. "Virtual Capacity and Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
11. Pablo Casas-Arce, 2004. "Layoffs and Quits in Repeated Games," Economics Series Working Papers 199, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
12. Larry Samuelson, 2003. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
13. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 699152000000000028, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(2), pages 173-192, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. V.V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1989. "Sustainable plans and mutual default," Staff Report 124, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Patrick E. Kehoe & V. V. Chari, 1990. "Sustainable Plans And Mutual Default," IMF Working Papers 90/22, International Monetary Fund.
    • Chari, V V & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1993. "Sustainable Plans and Mutual Default," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(1), pages 175-95, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000009, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
16. repec:att:wimass:19199818 is not listed on IDEAS
17. Juan-Pablo Montero & Juan Ignacio Guzmán, 2005. "Welfare-enhancing collusion in the presence of a competitive fringe," Working Papers 0511, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Juan Pablo Montero & Juan Ignacio Guzmán, 2005. "Welfare-Enhancing Collusion in the Presence of a Competitive Fringe," Documentos de Trabajo 298, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]