Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms

Author Info

Mookherjee, Dilip
Reichelstein, Stefan

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Consider the problem of Bayesian implementation, i.e., of constructing mechanisms with the property that all Bayesian equilibrium outcomes agree with a given choice rule. The authors show that a general procedure is to start with an incentive-compatible revelation mechanism, and then augment agents' message spaces in order to eliminate undesired equilibria. Specifically, they present an augmented revelation principle, which states that if there exists any mechanism that implements a given choice rule, then an augmented revelation mechanism will also implement it. This principle enables the authors to obtain necessary conditions for implementation. For a large class of environments, these conditions are also sufficient. Copyright 1990 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 57 (1990)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 453-75
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:57:y:1990:i:3:p:453-75

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0034-6527

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0034-6527

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay., 1989. "Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Pre-Play Communication," Working Papers 693, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, . "Type Diversity and Virtual Bayesian Implementation Creation-Date: 2000," Working Papers 2000-16, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2002. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2002-16, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2002. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2002-16R1, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
- Joel Watson & Jesse Bull, 2006. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2002-16R, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
- Joel Watson & Jesse Bull, 2004. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 433, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
- Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2007. "Hard evidence and mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 75-93, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Economics Working Papers 0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
Matthew O. Jackson, 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 966, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Matthew, Jackson O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay., 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanism," Working Papers 754, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay, 1994. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 474-501, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2006. "Dominant Strategy Implementation in Economic Environments," ISER Discussion Paper 0669, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Working Papers 5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Decisiveness and the Viability of the State," Working Papers 2000-03, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
d ASPREMONT, Claude & CRƒMER, Jacques & GƒRARD-VARET, Louis-AndrŽ, 2003. "Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives," CORE Discussion Papers 2003045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Claude d'Aspremont & Jacques Crémer & Louis-André Gérard-Varet, 2003. "Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 281-310, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Luis C. Corchon, 2007. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," Economics Working Papers we081207, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Sjostrom, Tomas & Yamato, Takehiko, 2003. "Secure Implementation: Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Reconsidered," Working Papers 9-03-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Tomas Sjostrom & Takehiko Yamato, 2003. "Secure Implementation:Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Reconsidered," Discussion papers 03019, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). [Downloadable!]
- Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Sjöström, Tomas & Yamato, Takehiko, 2003. "Secure Implementation: Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Reconsidered," Working Papers 1174, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen, 1994. "2-person Bayesian implementation," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 41-54, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Matthew O. Jackson, 1988. "Full Bayesian Implementation," Discussion Papers 791, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2004. "Dominant Strategy Implementation in Pure Exchange Economies," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 04-03-Rev, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), revised Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? There is a FAQ (frequently asked questions).

This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.