Workers versus Firms: Bargaining over a Firm's Value
AbstractWe introduce a distinction between a firm and its network of workers. In a competitive world, if networks are easily lured away, the workers must receive the entire value of their contribution to the firm. How then can service firms have equity value? A model is analyzed in which workers are paid less as a group than their value, even in a competitive world. The workers are assumed to have a nonwage benefit for working at the current firm; this benefit is privately known. These privately known benefits make it impossible for the workers to agree on a division of their value should they leave the existing firm for a new enterprise. The result is that the workers may receive a total compensation that is less than their contribution to the firm. Copyright 1990 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 57 (1990)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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